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Abstract 
 
Although CEO bonus plans traditionally use net income as the standard performance 
measure, there is an increasing trend that CEOs influence directors to adopt alternative 
non-GAAP performance metrics in setting bonuses. In this study, we analyze the 
managerial consequences of this alternative bonus contract design in the Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) industry. REITs provide a unique setting since most firms 
have been using FFO, an industry-specific non-GAAP performance measure, rather than 
net income, to determine CEO bonuses. Essentially, FFO consists of two components: net 
income, which is a GAAP measure, and a non-GAAP component that includes 
adjustments from net income made by firms. We examine to what extent CEO bonus 
arises as the result of manipulating these components. We also examine whether 
regulatory standards related to non-GAAP reporting and bonus disclosures are effective 
in mitigating such manipulation. Lastly, we analyze if good corporate governance 
constrains managerial opportunistic behavior. Our findings show, when given a choice to 
manipulate a GAAP versus a non-GAAP component, firms primarily choose to manage 
the non-GAAP component to increase bonuses. We further show that regulatory 
compensation disclosure standards and good governance mechanisms are important in 
reducing such manipulation. In additional analysis, we find that firms report less 
manipulation for bonus purposes in the post-financial crisis period, and CEO bonuses are 
higher at firms that report positive manipulations. Moreover, we do not find any 
association between FFO manipulation and other forms of compensation that are not 
directly linked to the FFO measure in compensation contract design. Finally, we show 
that capital market participants penalize firms’ manipulative activities on FFO, especially 
when such activities are accompanied by large CEO bonuses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although prior literature shows that audited, GAAP financial information 
provides a more credible signal than unaudited information,
1
 the reporting of alternative 
non-GAAP performance measures such as EBITDA has become an increasingly common 
occurrence in recent years (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). Also labeled as “pro forma” or 
“street” earnings, managers typically exclude some unusual or unexpected nonrecurring 
items (e.g., restructuring charges, extraordinary items) from GAAP net income in 
arriving at these alternative performance measures. The underlying premise is that these 
measures are more representative of a firm’s sustainable earnings. Prior research supports 
the view that non-GAAP disclosures contain useful and value relevant information for 
investors and analysts,
2
 and anecdotal evidence shows other stakeholders are also 
increasingly reliant on these non-GAAP metrics for decision-making.
3
 However, studies 
also find that opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP performance measures exists.
4
  
Recently, management has used variations of EBITDA not only as a 
supplementary signal of performance but also in compensation contract design. 
According to a recent Grant Thornton (2012) publication entitled “Financial Executive 
Compensation Survey”, the use of EBITDA (EBIT) in executive compensation plans, 
particularly bonus contracts, in public companies increased from 16% (15%) in 2008 to 
                                                 
1
See, for example, Libby (1979), Pany and Smith (1982) and Johnson, Pany and White (1983). 
2
Examples of studies that support the usefulness of non-GAAP measures include Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002); Brown and Sivakumar (2003); Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson (2003); Gu and Chen 
(2004); Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005); Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler (2007). 
3
For instance, investment firms such as Credit Suisse, McKinsey and Goldman Sachs tend to include 
Economic Value Added (EVA) along with other earnings and sales information as investment tools when 
analyzing deals. Rating agencies such as Moody’s and S&P commonly use EBITDA and EBIT in 
calculating interest coverage ratios to assess a firm’s financing ability.  
4
Examples of studies that find opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP performance measures include Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman (2003); Johnson and Schwartz (2005); Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007); Cohen, 
Hann, and Ogneva (2007); and Black and Christensen (2009). 
2 
 
30% (23%) in 2012. Notable examples of firms that adopt non-GAAP performance 
measures in determining executive bonus include Time Warner Inc. and Flower Foods.
5
 
Two recent studies (Isidro and Marques 2010; Black, Black, Christensen, and Waegelein, 
2011) show that executive compensation can significantly influence a firm’s decision to 
report alternative performance measures, even when compensation contracts are not 
explicitly linked to these measures. The intuition of these studies is that managers attempt 
to influence investors’ perception of firm performance through choosing to report these 
measures. Hence, it is highly plausible that the official adoption of non-GAAP alternative 
performance measures in determining bonus could further increase the risks of firms 
manipulating these non-GAAP measures, as evident in companies such as Nortel 
Network Corp.
6
  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential managerial consequences 
when the compensation contract explicitly ties the CEO bonus to a non-GAAP alternative 
performance measure. We utilize the unique setting of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) where firms commonly report a variant of EBITDA known as Funds from 
Operations (FFO),
7
 and most firms use FFO in their bonus contract design.
8
 To better 
                                                 
5
For example, in the 2009 proxy statement (DEF 14A) of Time Warner Inc., the company explicitly states 
that its “bonus pool to be determined for any calendar year based on a percentage of the amount by which 
the Company’s EBITDA for such year exceeds the Company’s average EBITDA for the preceding three 
years.” As another example, Flower Foods, a leading producer and marketer of packaged bakery food in the 
United States that trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), states on its website that “EBITDA is 
used as the primary performance measure in the company's Annual Executive Bonus Plan.” 
6
Nortel Network Corp. distributed huge bonuses to its top executives while the company was reporting net 
losses under GAAP. The bonuses were triggered when the company maneuvered its pro forma measure to 
achieve its income targets (Sturgeon 2012). 
7
Since REITs are tax-exempt entities and FFO excludes depreciation and amortization, the main component 
of FFO is in essence similar to EBITDA (except for interest costs). In the REIT industry, FFO has long 
been recognized as the industry-wide standard alternative performance measure (Sloan 1998). Prior 
academic evidence also shows that FFO is universally valued by investors (e.g., Vincent 1999; Fields, 
Rangan, and Thiagarajan 2001; Baik, Billings, and Morton 2008). 
8
This is based on the annual compensation survey by the National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (NAREIT). NAREIT is the trade organization for the REIT industry and has conducted the annual 
3 
 
align management behavior with shareholder interests, the REIT industry has established 
voluntary FFO guidelines. According to this recommended NAREIT definition, the 
calculation of FFO excludes (from net income) depreciation and amortization expenses 
related to real estate properties, their associated disposal gains and losses, and items that 
are unusual and/or nonrecurring in nature, namely extraordinary items, impairment write-
downs of depreciable real estate properties, discontinued operations, and cumulative 
effects of accounting changes.
9
 In essence, FFO consists of two components: net income, 
which is a GAAP measure, and a non-GAAP component that includes adjustments to net 
income. While incentive compensation contracts can effectively align the interests of 
managers and shareholders (e.g., Smith and Watts 1982; Jensen and Murphy 1990), the 
prior literature (e.g., Healy 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan 1995; Gaver, Gaver, 
and Austin 1995; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) recognizes 
that managers have incentives to engage in earnings management activities and to 
potentially manipulate net income when CEO compensation is linked to firm 
performance. Given that the adjustment items in FFO are unaudited (i.e., non-GAAP), 
there is a greater temptation for REIT managers to manage expectations using this FFO 
component.
10
  
                                                                                                                                                 
survey for 15 consecutive years. It is considered the industry's most comprehensive compensation report. 
We also verify this claim with our hand-collected sample and find that a whopping 82% of our sample 
firms have explicitly stated in their proxy statements the use of FFO in determining bonus. The remainder 
of the firms could also be using FFO in bonus determination though they do not specifically highlight this 
issue in their proxy statements. Lastly, academic evidence also lends support to this claim and shows 
compensation of REIT CEOs is significantly related to FFO (e.g., Pennathur and Shelor 2002; Pennathur, 
Gilley, and Shelor 2005; Griffin, Najand, and Weeks 2012).  
9
 See the “White Paper on Funds from Operations” published by NAREIT in 2002. 
10
However, two countervailing factors can temper this behavior. First, when firms make adjustments to net 
income to derive their non-GAAP measures, these ad-hoc exclusions could be quite transparent. Second, it 
is also questionable as to how much discretionary expenses a firm can exclude for managers to achieve the 
intended earnings management effect. Hence, in some cases, managers may still need to manipulate net 
income (i.e., the GAAP component of FFO) to achieve their bonus targets.  
4 
 
However, it is not obvious that managers will necessarily choose to manage 
expectations vis-à-vis the FFO component since disciplining mechanisms do exist to 
curtail FFO manipulative activities particularly those driven by bonus concerns. In 
addition to NAREIT’s continuous effort to encourage REIT firms in following its 
voluntary guidelines in FFO reporting (NAREIT 1999; 2002), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted Regulation G in 2003 to curtail the misreporting of 
non-GAAP information. The SEC also mandated new rules in 2006 to further govern 
compensation disclosure which includes incentive-based executive compensation. Firms 
also have the ability to inhibit inappropriate management behavior through internal 
corporate governance.
11
 Lastly, the stock market provides yet another mechanism to deter 
FFO manipulation through penalizing firms with a valuation discount. We therefore 
investigate the extent to which these various disciplinary mechanisms – voluntary 
NAREIT guidelines, mandatory government standards, internal corporate governance, 
and the stock market – are effective in mitigating opportunistic managerial behavior that 
is related to the firms’ non-GAAP performance measures which is motivated by bonus 
considerations.  
To test if CEO bonus compensation is related to FFO manipulation we use a 
sample of 436 CEO-firm-year observations over the 2006 to 2011 period. Our salient 
findings include the following: (1) Managers, as predicted, are more likely to manipulate 
the non-GAAP component (i.e., adjustment items) rather than the GAAP component (i.e., 
                                                 
11
 Prior evidence (e.g., Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt 2003; Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam 2008) shows that opportunistic management on net income is associated with weak 
governance quality. If corporate governance is also effective in improving the quality of non-GAAP 
reporting (Mbagwu 2007), we should expect managers at firms with stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms would be less tempted to engage in manipulating their non-GAAP measures to boost CEO 
bonuses. 
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net income) of FFO for bonus purposes to “game the system” when given the 
opportunity. Nonetheless, the insignificance of discretionary accruals (a common proxy 
of managerial manipulation in net income) in affecting bonus payoff is in striking 
contrast to prior literature (e.g., Holthausen et al. 1995). (2) While most firms disclose the 
use of NAREIT guidelines and adhere to Regulation G in reporting FFO, both voluntary 
industry guidance and mandatory regulation with regard to non-GAAP reporting are 
ineffective in constraining managerial manipulation for bonus purposes. (3) Although 
compensation disclosure regulations improve the transparency of the performance 
measure and are more effective in controlling FFO manipulation, not all firms adhere to 
these regulations. (4) General corporate governance mechanisms do constrain FFO 
manipulation. In additional analysis, we also find that (5) opportunistic financial 
reporting for bonus purposes is lower in the post-financial crisis period. Ex-ante, one 
would expect that less opportunities exist to manipulate performance after the crisis due 
to increased scrutiny and improved governance. (6) FFO manipulation for bonus 
purposes is concentrated at firms that report positive differences of actual FFO and 
NAREIT definition. (7) We do not find any significant relation between FFO 
manipulation and other forms of compensation, indicating it is the specific design of 
bonus compensation contract, and not the perception of better non-GAAP performance in 
general (Isidro and Marques 2010; Black et al. 2011), that drives our results. Finally, (8) 
firms with larger manipulation for bonus purposes have lower equity valuation,
12
 which 
suggests that the capital market also acts as a disciplining mechanism.  
                                                 
12
This is consistent with the previous literature which has examined the capital market consequences of 
earnings management and generally finds firms that are of lower quality and more susceptible to earnings 
manipulating activities have higher cost of capital (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005). 
6 
 
Our study utilizes an ideal setting that allows us to explore the manipulation of a 
non-GAAP performance measure for compensation purposes. As previously mentioned, 
firms in the REIT industry uniformly adopt FFO in performance reporting. Many REITs 
also use FFO to explicitly determine their executive bonus compensation. Equally 
important is the fact that NAREIT provides a recommended FFO definition, enabling us 
to proxy for the magnitude of manipulation on a non-GAAP performance measure. To 
the best of our knowledge, we know of no other industry that has issued similar 
guidelines. Although one could argue that FFO is not used in other industries as a 
performance measure and thus our study represents a special case, we believe that the 
REIT setting offers generalizable insights on managerial behavior for other firms that 
also use non-GAAP performance measures for incentive compensation since FFO is 
essentially a variant of EBITDA.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, we provide 
novel evidence of opportunistic managerial behavior when a non-GAAP performance 
measure is explicitly incorporated into compensation contracts. In particular, we 
decompose the alternative performance measure into its GAAP and non-GAAP 
components and show how managers “game the system.”13 Despite the increasing trend 
of firms adopting non-GAAP performance measures in bonus contract design, limited 
research currently exists which examines how CEO bonuses can distort non-GAAP 
                                                 
13
 To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one study by Zhu (2009) that looks into a similar issue. 
However, the author finds no result of REIT managers using FFO to increase CEO bonus. We attribute to 
the differences in our findings to the fact that the prior study uses a sample period of 1996-2000 which is 
prior to the adoption of the recommended FFO definition by NAREIT in 2000 and prior to most REITs 
incorporating FFO as a benchmark in compensation contracts. Baik et al. (2008) point out that the NAREIT 
definition of FFO in 2000 has greatly improved uniformity of the measure. The findings in the prior study 
thus suffer from serious measurement errors in quantifying FFO discretions. Moreover, the prior study does 
not consider how REIT managers use the GAAP or non-GAAP components for manipulative purposes and 
how regulatory mechanisms imposed subsequent to 2000 could mitigate this possibility, which we believe 
are the important issues addressed in our study. 
7 
 
reporting. Two recent studies look into how compensation concerns affect pro forma 
earnings (Isidro and Marques 2010; Black et al. 2011). Unfortunately, a severe data 
limitation with pro forma studies is that it is difficult to determine if these firms are in 
fact using an alternative performance measure in their compensation contracts. 
Consequently, it is difficult to directly link CEO compensation to a non-GAAP metric. 
There is also little consensus on how firms define pro forma earnings in different 
industries thus making it problematic to quantify the extent of pro forma manipulation. 
Another distinguishing feature of our study is that we show that the design of the 
CEO bonus contract based on a non-GAAP performance measure can provide incentives 
for managers to manipulate earnings through an innovative form of classification 
shifting.
14
  
We also contribute to the economic literature on regulation by evaluating the 
effectiveness of various disciplining mechanisms to control managerial opportunistic 
behavior. Although NAREIT guidance and Regulation G both govern the reporting of 
FFO, the former represents voluntary self-regulation while the SEC enforces the latter. 
The SEC is also responsible for enforcing the new compensation disclosure requirements 
that govern executive compensation. Limited literature currently exists on disclosure 
regulation (see Healy and Palepu 2001), particularly related to both non-GAAP financial 
                                                 
14
Unlike findings on accrual and real earnings management, evidence of earnings management with 
classification shifting is relatively scant. For instance, McVay (2006) shows firms may engage in earnings 
management using classification shifting of special items such that their “core” (pro forma) earnings meet 
analyst forecast. Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas (2010) show classification shifting of special items 
happens more often in the fourth quarter when managers are less able to manipulate accruals. Other studies 
show that firms exercise discretion in defining extraordinary items to achieve classification shifting for 
income smoothing (See for example Beattie et al. (1994); Godfrey and Jones (1999); and Athanasakou, 
Strong, and Walker (2007)). 
8 
 
reporting
15
 and compensation disclosure.
16
  Our research responds to the call of Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008) for further studies that evaluate the complementary nature among 
different disclosure regulations.  
Lastly, we contribute to the growing literature on corporate governance and non-
GAAP reporting.
17
 Two recent studies (Jennings and Marques 2011; Frankel, McVay, 
and Soliman 2011) specifically examine Regulation G and show that the regulation has 
reduced the association between corporate governance and opportunistic non-GAAP 
reporting. We show that internal corporate governance mechanisms continue to act as 
important safeguards in constraining manipulative managerial behavior. Moreover, 
increased scrutiny subsequent to the financial crisis could also be attributed to improved 
governance by corporate boards, resulting in lower manipulative activities post-financial 
crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the 
institutional background for our research setting. Section three develops the hypothesis 
and outlines our research design while section four outlines the sample selection process 
and presents descriptive statistics. Our empirical results are presented in the fifth section 
while the final section summarizes our conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
E.g., Marques (2006); Heflin and Hsu (2008); Kolev, Marquardt, and McVay (2008); and Fortin, Liu, and 
Tsang (2011). 
16
E.g., Vefeas and Afexentiou (1998); Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999); Lo (2003); Craighead, Magnan, 
and Thorne (2004); Robinson, Xue, and Yu (2009). 
17
This literature includes but is not limited to Klein (2002); Xie et al. (2003); and Bowen et al. (2008). 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The REIT industry has long argued that GAAP net income does not accurately 
reflect firm performance given the mandatory inclusion of accounting depreciation
18
 and 
several nonrecurring items that provide little information in evaluating REIT 
performance. To address this concern, NAREIT introduced the concept of FFO in 1991 
as an alternative non-GAAP performance measure to supplement net income in 
measuring firm profitability. Since then, FFO has become the standard industry-wide 
measure. Prior research generally shows that both net income and FFO provide useful 
information that market participants value.
19
 However, continued concerns exist that 
REIT managers use FFO to mislead investors since FFO is a non-GAAP measure. In an 
effort to improve the uniformity and transparency of FFO, NAREIT issued a “White 
Paper on Funds from Operations” in 2002 that provided a recommended FFO definition 
and published reporting guidelines that its member firms are encouraged to follow when 
presenting FFO in their financial statements. Baik et al. (2008) show that these increased 
industry efforts at self-regulation have reduced managerial discretion and increased the 
uniformity and improved the transparency of FFO reporting. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that REIT managers’ compliance to the NAREIT-recommended FFO 
is far from perfect (Romanek 2003). 
Concerned that companies provide non-GAAP performance measures to mislead 
investors, the SEC adopted Regulation G in 2003 to govern non-GAAP reporting.  The 
                                                 
18
 For instance, Ben-Shahar, Sulganik, and Tsang (2011) show accounting depreciation reported by REITs 
suffer from huge measurement errors, thereby distorting the value relevance of REIT net income. Kang and 
Zhao (2010) show REIT accounting depreciation deviates from economic depreciation to a greater extent 
than other industries.   
19
In the accounting literature, see Fields, Rangan, and Thiagarajan (1998) and Vincent (1999). The real 
estate literature provides further evidence as in Graham and Knight (2000); Stunda and Typpo (2004); and 
Hayunga and Stephens (2009). 
10 
 
regulation requires firms to explain why management believes the non-GAAP 
information is beneficial to investors. The regulation also states that when firms report 
non-GAAP performance measures, these measures must not contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact. More importantly, the regulation requires firms that report non-GAAP 
information to disclose the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure with a 
reconciliation schedule of the non-GAAP measure to this GAAP measure. Research that 
examines the effect of Regulation G largely focuses on pro forma earnings. These 
findings generally indicate a decreased likelihood of firms reporting pro forma earnings 
(e.g., Marques 2006) but an overall improvement in the reporting quality of pro forma 
earnings (e.g., Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008). In the context of the REIT 
industry, Fortin et al. (2011) finds a uniform improvement in the quality of FFO 
disclosures subsequent to the enactment of Regulation G. Interestingly, focusing on a 
much later time period of 2006-2011, our sample still shows that some firms have not 
complied fully (namely, by providing reconciliation) with this regulation. 
In 2006, the SEC mandated new rules on compensation disclosures in 2006 under 
Item 402 of Regulation S-K that require a new Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
(CD&A) section in the proxy statements to improve the quality and quantity of executive 
compensation information that management presents. The amended regulation requires 
disclosures in five categories: (a) option disclosures, (b) compensation discussion and 
analysis, (c) a summary compensation table, (d) exercises and holdings of previously 
awarded equity interests, and (e) post-employment compensation. Companies are 
required to disclose specific quantitative or qualitative performance-related targets in the 
CD&A unless such disclosure involves confidential information and disclosing the 
11 
 
information will have an adverse effect on the company. However, if the company uses 
targets that it does not disclose, the company must provide detailed discussions on how 
difficult or likely it will be for the company to achieve the undisclosed targets. The new 
rule covers all forms of performance targets, so if the company decides to use 
performance targets based on a non-GAAP financial measure, the company must also 
disclose how the measures are derived in the audited financial statements. A recent study 
by Robinson et al. (2009) shows non-compliance with the new compensation disclosure 
requirement is associated with excessive CEO compensation and higher media criticisms 
of CEO compensation.     
 
 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
 Healy (1985) shows that management bonuses tied to an accounting number can 
create incentives for manipulation. Research has subsequently shown that net income is 
subject to more severe manipulation when it is used as the benchmark to determine the 
bonus (e.g., Holthausen et al. 1995). In the REIT industry, the bonus is directly linked to 
FFO. Given that FFO is a non-GAAP unaudited performance measure, it is susceptible to 
more management discretion than the GAAP-governed net income measure. Hence, it is 
possible for firms to opportunistically use FFO to enhance firm performance to increase 
performance-based compensation. 
 If REIT managers do manipulate FFO for compensation purposes, an interesting 
question regards the strategy chosen to achieve their goals. Unlike the net income 
measure, managers who intend to manipulate a non-GAAP alternative performance 
12 
 
measure have the option of exercising discretion in the calculation of the non-GAAP 
component, the GAAP component, or both. As firms’ adherence to the recommended 
NAREIT definition of FFO is voluntary, managers can choose to report an ad-hoc, firm-
defined FFO that adjusts (from net income) for additional items that managers deem 
appropriate. In fact, NAREIT has specifically stated that firms have the discretion to 
exclude items from FFO if managers have a good justification (NAREIT 2003).
20
 
However, this flexibility also increases the potential of managers to manipulate FFO 
through the selective inclusion or exclusion of items in their firm-defined FFO measure. 
As a result, we expect firms to have a greater incentive to manipulate these adjustment 
items, i.e., the non-GAAP component of FFO, to increase bonus compensation. However, 
since Regulation G has made these non-GAAP adjustments more transparent to financial 
statement users, managers may not be as motivated to include too many ad-hoc 
adjustments in the non-GAAP component. This gives rise to our first hypothesis: 
H1A: CEO bonus compensation tied to an alternative non-GAAP performance 
measure is positively associated with the level of manipulation in the non-GAAP 
component of this measure. 
While REIT managers can manipulate the non-GAAP adjustments in FFO to 
increase performance-based compensation, they can also engage in earnings management 
of the GAAP component in FFO to affect the non-GAAP performance measure. Note 
non-GAAP performance measures (e.g., pro forma earnings, EBITDA, FFO) are 
typically derived as the result of adjustments to a GAAP measure (i.e., usually net 
income). Hence, earnings management on the GAAP measure can affect both GAAP and 
                                                 
20
This is due to the diversity of the nature of nonrecurring items, hence some items (e.g., debt restructuring 
expenses, straight-line rent expense) that are not commonly reported by REITs are not considered in the 
recommended exclusions. 
13 
 
non-GAAP performance measures. For REITs, managers can thus affect FFO through 
manipulating net income. One could argue that managers may not want to manipulate the 
GAAP-governed net income measure for compensation purposes when they have the 
alternative choice of manipulating the non-GAAP component. However, prior research 
(e.g., Doyle et al. 2003) shows that large GAAP-non-GAAP differences are a detrimental 
signal to future firm value. Consequently, managers are somewhat constrained in taking 
too much liberties with the non-GAAP component. This is especially true for the REIT 
industry, given the recommended FFO definition that affords investors an approximation 
of FFO-net income differences. Moreover, it is also questionable how much discretionary 
expenses a firm can exclude from FFO for REIT managers to achieve the intended 
earnings management effect. Therefore, managers might still have an incentive to pursue 
earnings management of the GAAP component in order to increase CEO bonuses. Our 
next hypothesis is therefore defined as follows:              
H1B: CEO bonus compensation tied to a non-GAAP measure is positively 
associated with the level of manipulation in the GAAP component of this measure. 
 We next consider the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms to constrain 
potential FFO manipulation. While few, if any, standards exist as to how pro forma 
earnings are defined, the REIT industry provides detailed FFO guidelines. These self-
regulatory efforts have proved useful in improving the transparency of the FFO measure. 
For instance, Baik et al. (2008) show that the frequency of managers using FFO to meet 
or beat analysts forecast has declined subsequent to increased industry efforts to promote 
a uniform definition of FFO. However, since industry guidance is voluntary, managers 
who wish to manipulate FFO for bonus purposes aren’t likely to adhere to the industry 
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definition. We therefore expect a lower association between CEO bonus and FFO 
manipulation when firms voluntarily disclose their adherence to the NAREIT industry 
guidance;
21
 we thus define the first part of our second hypothesis as follows:  
     H2A: The adherence to industry self-regulatory efforts reduces the association 
of CEO bonus compensation tied to a non-GAAP performance measure and the level of 
manipulation in the measure. 
Prior research shows that Regulation G is effective in constraining opportunistic 
reporting behavior of pro forma earnings (e.g., Kolev et al. 2008) as well as FFO (e.g., 
Fortin et al. 2011). Until recently however, the SEC had not initiated any enforcement 
action for the noncompliance of Regulation G.
22
 Our sample shows that some firms did 
not comply with the key requirement of Regulation G to provide a reconciliation of the 
non-GAAP measure and the GAAP measure. Both Baik et al. (2008) and Fortin et al. 
(2011) have shown reconciliation is an effective device to improve the transparency of 
FFO reporting. We conjecture that managers who have less intention to manipulate FFO 
to affect CEO compensation will follow Regulation G and disclose the reconciliation 
schedule. Managers who want to manipulate FFO have a stronger incentive to omit the 
disclosure of such important information. Hence, we expect a lower association between 
CEO bonus and FFO manipulation when firms comply with the reconciliation disclosure 
requirement of Regulation G. We therefore define the second part of our second 
hypothesis as follows:  
                                                 
21
 Note firms can still make ad-hoc adjustments (with justification) to their reported FFO measure even if 
they disclose the use of NAREIT FFO definition. Hence, we are not claiming that firms that state the use of 
NAREIT FFO definition should report an actual and NAREIT-defined FFO difference of zero. In essence, 
we conjecture firms that voluntarily disclose the use of NAREIT FFO definition would want to convey a 
greater signal of transparency, and these firms should be less likely to manipulate FFO. 
22
 The SEC filed its first enforcement action under Regulation G on November 12, 2009 to SafeNet, Inc., 
claiming that the company made improper adjustments to the company’s recurring expenses without factual 
support (Katz 2009). 
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H2B: The compliance to Regulation G’s reconciliation requirement reduces the 
association of CEO bonus compensation tied to a non-GAAP performance measure and 
the level of manipulation in the measure. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that even with mandatory compensation disclosure and 
severe compliance penalties, some firms still provide incomplete and even fraudulent 
compensation disclosure, eventually resulting in SEC enforcement actions (Wood and 
Missal 2006).
23
 We conjecture that managers who want to manipulate FFO to increase 
CEO bonuses have stronger incentives to obscure compensation disclosure. We focus on 
the disclosure of benchmarks as they are the most relevant and quantifiable factors for 
bonus determination (Indjejikian and Nanda 2002). We expect a lower association 
between CEO bonus and FFO manipulation for firms that comply with the SEC 
compensation disclosure requirement, i.e., revealing their benchmarks used and formulae 
in determining the bonus. We define the final part of our second hypothesis as follows:  
H2C: The compliance to the SEC compensation disclosure requirements reduces 
the association of CEO bonus compensation tied to a non-GAAP performance measure 
and the level of manipulation in the measure. 
Finally, a natural question that arises is whether the board of directors disciplines 
managers for actions taken especially those that mis-align owner-management incentives. 
Much empirical research (e.g., Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003; Bowen et al. 2008) has 
examined whether earnings management, as measured by accrual (Bhattacharya et al. 
2003; Francis et al. 2005) and real activities (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010), is 
mitigated at firms with good internal governance. We conjecture that good corporate 
                                                 
23
 For example, the SEC has initiated enforcement proceedings against General Electric Co. in 2004 and 
against Tyson Foods Inc. in 2005.  
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governance hinders FFO manipulation that is motivated by CEO bonus considerations. 
This leads to our final hypotheses in alternative form, as follows: 
H3: Better corporate governance results in lower manipulation in the non-GAAP 
performance measure driven by bonus purposes.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
Our first two hypotheses (H1A and H1B) examine whether REIT managers 
manipulate different components of FFO to increase CEO bonuses. We use the following 
regression models: 
BONUS = α + β1 FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 
CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε           (1) 
 
BONUS = α + β1 DACC + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 
CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε                 (2) 
 
Where the dependent variable is total annual bonus (in thousands) awarded to the CEO. 
Our key variables of interest are FFOMANI and DACC. FFOMANI measures the level of 
manipulation in the non-GAAP component of FFO. We follow the real estate literature 
(e.g., Zhu, Ong and Yeo 2010; Anglin, Edelstein, Gao, and Tsang 2013) and measure 
FFOMANI as the deviation of actual FFO from normal FFO. Normal FFO is defined, as 
in Fortin et al. (2011), as net income adjusted for depreciation and amortization expenses 
related to real estate properties, their associated disposal gains and losses, and items that 
are unusual and/or nonrecurring in nature, namely extraordinary items, discontinued 
operations, and cumulative effects of accounting changes (as in the NAREIT 
definition).
24
 DACC represents manipulation in net income, the GAAP component of 
                                                 
24
 We follow NAREIT’s further guidance on FFO in 2003 that advises firms should no longer exclude 
impairment write-downs from FFO in accordance with SEC position (NAREIT 2003). 
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FFO. We use the level of discretionary accruals to estimate the level of manipulation in 
net income. We measure DACC using the modified Jones model, as proposed in Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995).
25
 We use the signed instead of the absolute discretionary 
accruals since firms should have positive discretionary accruals if managers want to 
increase CEO bonus compensation. Given that CEO bonuses are typically determined by 
firm performance on a per-share basis, both variables are scaled by average common 
shares outstanding. If managers manipulate both components of FFO to increase CEO 
bonus compensation, we should observe positive and significant coefficients for both 
FFOMANI and DACC.  
 We include control variables that affect the level of CEO bonus compensation. 
Not surprisingly, prior research shows that REITs’ CEO bonuses are directly tied to 
FFO.
26
 We use normal FFO per share
27
 (NAREIT_FFO) as our proxy for FFO 
performance. We include firm size measured as the log of beginning-of-year total assets 
and expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
28
 Since prior research (e.g., Davis and 
Shelor 1995) shows that firm growth has a positive impact on CEO compensation, we 
include Tobin’s q measured as the market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB) to capture future 
growth opportunities. We also include variables that capture CEO characteristics. These 
variables include CEO_DIR (a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO serves a dual role 
                                                 
25
 For the accounting and finance literature on alternative measurement of accruals, please see Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006); and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008). In unreported robustness analysis, we also conduct 
our study using alternative accrual measures in Dechow and Dichve (2002) and Kothari et al. (2005) and 
obtain similar results. 
26
See for example Pennathur and Shelor (2002); Pennathur et al. (2005); and Griffin et al. (2012). 
27
 This measure ideally excludes the non-GAAP component in FFO, but it is possible that NAREIT_FFO 
may still contemplate the effect of DACC since it encompasses net income. In our robustness check, we 
conduct further test by including only the component of FFO performance that is not affected by DACC as 
our performance control variable. Our findings remain the same.   
28
For the reasons why we expect positive coefficient please refer to Ghosh and Sirmans (2005); Feng, 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2007); Eichholtz, Kok, and Otten (2008); and Feng et al. (2010). 
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as director of the board and zero otherwise), CEO_COMP (a dummy variable equal to 
one if the CEO serves as a member on the compensation committee, zero otherwise), and 
CEO_TENURE (measured as the number of years the CEO has served the firm). We 
expect each of these variables to have a positive effect on the CEO bonus.
29
 Since 
property types of REITs are important determinants of a REIT’s operating structure and 
they also affect CEO compensation (e.g., Hardin 1998), we include property type 
dummies in the regressions. We also include year dummies in our regressions given that 
our sample period covers the volatile period of 2006-2011. 
 To account for the possibility that a REIT manager may manipulate both the 
GAAP and non-GAAP components when they have exhausted either option, we include 
the interaction of FFOMANI and DACC in the following model and expect a positive 
coefficient for the interaction term: 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B DACC + β1C FFOMANI*DACC + β2 NAREIT_FFO 
+ β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε             (3) 
 
Next, we examine the effect of regulatory forces on the association of CEO bonus 
and FFO manipulation. Regulatory guidance can be implemented on the reporting of non-
GAAP measures and on the disclosure of compensation contracts. We postulate both 
forces should be effective in constraining the manipulation of non-GAAP reporting that 
arises from bonus concerns. To test these hypotheses, we first augment models (1) and 
(2), introducing additional variables to capture firms’ compliance to non-GAAP 
reporting, i.e., the NAREIT industry guidance of FFO and SEC’s Regulation G: 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI/DACC*(D_NAREIT) + β1B FFOMANI/DACC*(1-
D_NAREIT) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + 
β7 CEO_TENURE + ε   (4.1) 
                                                 
29
Previous REIT studies that have looked at these CEO variables include Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007), 
Feng et al. (2010) and Griffin et al. (2012).  
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BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI/DACC*(D_RECON) + β1B FFOMANI/DACC*(1-
D_RECON) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + 
β7 CEO_TENURE + ε       (4.2) 
 
 In specification (4.1), D_NAREIT is a dummy variable equal to one (zero 
otherwise) when REIT managers disclose that they have adopted the NAREIT definition 
of FFO. Our coefficients of interest are β1A and β1B. We expect a significantly lower 
positive coefficient for β1A as compared to β1B, since voluntary disclosure of the use of 
the NAREIT definition acts as a signal that managers are more committed to the 
transparency of FFO reporting. These managers should be less likely to manipulate FFO 
to increase CEO bonus.
30
 In specification (4.2), D_RECON is a dummy variable equal to 
one (zero otherwise) when REIT managers comply with Regulation G and provide a 
reconciliation between FFO and net income. We also expect a lower positive coefficient 
for β1A (as compared to β1B) since the provision of a reconciliation schedule reduces 
management opportunity to manipulate FFO and in turn affect the CEO bonus.  
We examine the impact of the new compensation disclosure regulation in 
specifications (5.1) and (5.2):  
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI/DACC*(D_FFOTARGET) + β1B FFOMANI/DACC*(1-
D_FFOTARGET) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 
CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε (5.1) 
 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI/DACC*(D_WFFO) + β1B FFOMANI/DACC*(1-
D_WFFO) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + 
β7 CEO_TENURE + ε        (5.2) 
 
Specifically, we focus on the disclosure of benchmarks with regard to bonus 
determination. D_FFOTARGET is a dummy variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if 
                                                 
30
 We choose to present our regulation dummies as D_NAREIT and (1-D_NAREIT) instead of an interaction 
model interacting FFOMANI/DACC with D_NAREIT in order to compare the coefficients across two 
subgroups of firms. Using the alternative model does not change our conclusions since the two model 
specifications are variants of each other. 
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firms have a target FFO level and/or growth and managers decide to disclose this target. 
In addition, we find that a substantial portion of our sample firms also disclose the 
weights they use on different factors when determining CEO bonus.
31
 We include 
D_WFFO, a dummy variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if firms report their bonus 
weighting scheme. 
Lastly, we examine the impact of internal corporate governance on the association 
of FFO manipulation and CEO bonus. Prior evidence (e.g., Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003; 
Bowen et al. 2008) shows that opportunistic earnings management is associated with 
weak governance quality. Extant research (e.g., Boyd 1994; Core, Houlthausen, and 
Larcker 1999; Cyert, Kang, and Kumar 2002) also shows weaker corporate governance 
structure is associated with greater agency problem and higher executive pay. In the 
context of non-GAAP reporting, Mbagwu (2007) shows that board independence is 
positively associated with quality of non-GAAP measures. However, Jennings and 
Marques (2011) and Frankel et al. (2011) show that subsequent to Regulation G, the 
association between corporate governance and the level of opportunism on non-GAAP 
reporting declines; regulation is an effective substitute for internal corporate governance. 
We thus include a corporate governance index CG_INDEX in the following model:  
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI/DACC + β1B CG_INDEX + β1C 
FFOMANI/DACC*CG_INDEX + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ 
β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε   (6) 
 
This corporate governance index is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
31
 In fact, the compensation disclosure requirement states that firms should address in their CD&A how 
each element of compensation is determined in terms of the amount and formula, if applicable. Hence, the 
weighting of factors in determining bonus is also a required, albeit less explicit, disclosure requirement.   
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IV. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Our sample includes 157 REITs in the U.S. over the 2006-2011 period taken from 
the Capital IQ database for which we can obtain compensation data. Since detailed 
compensation disclosure is relatively scarce prior to the passage of compensation 
disclosure regulation, the start year of 2006 is chosen. We exclude 38 mortgage REITs 
from our sample given that these REITs use a different performance metric and FFO is 
typically not reported for this sub-sector. Our sample thus includes 119 equity REITs 
(both active and inactive) with 603 distinct firm-year observations, of which 540 CEO-
firm-years have bonus information.
32
 We match this sample with firm data from SNL 
Financials. We obtain FFO information for 517 observations and are able to calculate 
discretionary accruals (using the modified Jones model) for 444 observations. We require 
non-missing data on other firm variables. Our final sample contains 436 CEO-firm-year 
observations. Our sample is further reduced to 405 observations once CEO characteristics 
are included from Capital IQ. We present our results using both the full sample (436 
observations) and the reduced sample (405 observations) in the empirical analysis 
section. We hand-collect information on firms’ compliance to three different voluntary 
and mandatory regulatory standards (industry FFO guidelines, Regulation G, and 
compensation disclosure). Firms’ disclosure on whether they use the NAREIT definition 
of FFO and FFO reconciliation are found in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) section in the 10-K filings. We obtain disclosure information on executive 
compensation in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) section from the 
annual proxy statements (DEF-14A). Finally, the Corporate Governance Index Score is 
                                                 
32
 Our sample size is comparable to prior REIT studies on CEO compensation. For example, Feng et al. 
(2010) use a sample of 124 REITs for the year 1998, while Ertugrul et al. (2008) use 100, 100, and 112 
REITs respectively for the 1999-2001 period in their study. 
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obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). We obtain our measure of overall 
firm-specific corporate governance from ISS based on their most recent 2013 measures.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the total sample. On average, the CEO 
bonus amounts to $442.47 (in thousands).
33
 FFOMANI and DACC have means of 0.43 
and 0.90 (per share) respectively. The sample firms report an average NAREIT_FFO of 
$1.89 per share, SIZE of 14.56 and MTB/Tobin’s q of 1.71. On average, 47% of CEOs 
serves as the chairman of the board, and 5% of CEOs also serves as a member of the 
compensation committee. A CEO has an average tenure of 9.62 years. For the regulatory 
variables, we find that 74% of firms on average explicitly state they follow the NAREIT 
FFO definition.
34
 An average of 82% of firms adhere to Regulation G (e.g., the provision 
of a reconciliation schedule between FFO and a GAAP performance measure). 
D_FFOTARGET has a mean of 0.50. An average of 39% of the firms also disclose their 
weighting of FFO in setting their CEO bonus. Finally, the CG_INDEX measure ranges 
from 1 to 10, and our sample firms report a mean (median) of 5.46 (6). 
Pearson correlations of the regression variables are reported in Table 2. We find 
that BONUS is positively correlated with FFOMANI. Surprisingly, it is negatively 
correlated with DACC. We find that the BONUS is also negatively related to all 
regulatory disclosure variables with statistically significant correlation coefficients for 
                                                 
33
 Capital IQ defines cash compensation as the sum of salary, bonus and non-equity incentive 
compensation; and non-cash compensation as the sum of stock awards, option awards, non-equity 
incentives, pension change and other compensation. Our sample firms report an average CEO cash 
compensation of $1576.17 (in thousands) and non-cash compensation of $1631.95 (in thousands). Hence, 
bonus represents 13.79% of total CEO compensation. 
34
 We acknowledge there is a possibility that firms are actually following the NAREIT definition of FFO 
without explicitly disclosing the use of the NAREIT definition. On the other hand, firms that disclose the 
use of NAREIT FFO definition nonetheless report actual FFOs that can be substantially different from 
NAREIT_FFO. However, as mentioned, our variable D_NAREIT is not intended to capture actual 
conformance to the NAREIT definition. Instead, D_NAREIT measures the disclosure quality with regard to 
the industry self-regulation assuming all REITs follow the NAREIT definition of FFO to a certain extent.   
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D_NAREIT, D_FFOTARGET and D_WFFO. As expected, D_NAREIT and D_RECON 
are significantly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.64, and D_FFOTARGET 
and D_WFFO are also significantly correlated (coefficient of 0.50).   
       
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Main Findings 
 Table 3 presents the empirical results for regression equation (1) through equation 
(3). All regressions are estimated using ordinary least square (OLS) with robust standard 
errors. Columns I and II report the results of specification (1) with FFOMANI as our key 
variable of interest for our full sample and reduced sample (with the inclusion of CEO 
characteristics) respectively. We find that FFOMANI is significant and positively related 
to CEO bonus. The findings suggest that when bonus is explicitly tied to a non-GAAP 
measure, managers are tempted to manipulate the non-GAAP component. More 
specifically, REIT managers deviate from the recommended NAREIT definition of FFO 
by incorporating discretionary positive exclusions. We also find that NAREIT_FFO, 
SIZE, MTB as well as CEO_COMP have the expected signs and are significantly 
associated with the CEO bonus.  
 Columns III and IV in Table 3 present the results of specification (2). We find that 
signed discretionary accruals are unrelated to bonus compensation, implying that REIT 
managers do not manage discretionary accruals to affect CEO bonus when the bonus 
contract is tied to a non-GAAP performance measure. Our results contrast the extant 
literature that documents a positive association between CEO compensation and 
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discretionary accruals when compensation is directly linked to a GAAP measure (e.g., 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Balsam 1998).  
We obtain the same findings when both DACC, FFOMANI and their interaction 
are included in the same regressions in model (3) with the results reported in columns V 
and VI. DACC remains insignificant while FFOMANI remains significant. The 
interaction term FFOMANI*DACC is insignificant which indicates that REIT managers 
do not manipulate both GAAP and non-GAAP components. 
We next examine the impact that regulatory constraints exert on managerial 
behavior in terms of the association of FFO manipulation to CEO bonus. Given our 
findings that REIT managers only manipulate the non-GAAP component of FFO to 
increase their bonus, we simply present the results with FFOMANI as the explanatory 
variable in subsequent analysis.
35
 Table 4 reports the results of regression specification 
(4.1) and (4.2). Columns I and II present results of the regression specification (4.1). We 
find significant and positive associations between bonus and FFOMANI for both groups 
of firms that choose to voluntarily disclose and not disclose the adoption of NAREIT 
FFO definition. It is interesting that firms that choose to disclose that they follow the 
NAREIT FFO definition report a lower association between bonus and FFOMANI, 
although the differences between β1A and β1B are not statistically significant. The next two 
columns of Table 4 report the results of the regression specification (4.2). Although we 
do not find that the provision of a reconciliation schedule between FFO and net income 
affects the impact of FFO manipulation on bonus (as evident by the slightly higher 
                                                 
35
 We find that the inclusion of the disclosure variables does not change our conclusions with regard to the 
insignificance of DACC. Hence, the results with DACC as the explanatory variable are not tabulated but are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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coefficients for β1A as compared to β1B), we continue to find positive associations 
between CEO bonus and FFO manipulation for all firms.  
Table 5 reports the results of regression specifications (5.1) and (5.2). We find 
that regulatory mechanisms with respect to compensation disclosures have a statistically 
significant effect with FFOMANI on CEO bonus. The impact of FFO manipulation on 
CEO bonus is no longer significant for firms that disclose their FFO targets and the 
weighing formulae to determine bonus (i.e., D_FFOTARGET =1 and D_WFFO =1). On 
the other hand, FFOMANI remains positively significantly related to CEO bonus for the 
group of firms that do not adhere to the compensation disclosure regulation. Overall, our 
findings suggest that disclosure of the FFO targets and weights in bonus calculation plays 
an important role in improving the transparency of the performance measure. Our results 
extend the recent findings by Robinson et al. (2009) that show noncompliance with the 
new compensation disclosure is associated with excess CEO compensation.  
In Table 6, we report results of regression specification (6). Consistent with the 
prior literature (e.g., Boyd 1994; Core et al. 1999; Cyert et al. 2002), we find that the 
level of corporate governance has a significant impact on CEO compensation. In our 
particular setting, we find that good corporate governance constrains the opportunistic 
reporting of FFO for bonus purposes, as the impact of FFO manipulation on CEO bonus 
is mitigated for firms with a higher level of good corporate governance. To ensure the 
robustness of our findings, in unreported analysis we also adopt an alternative corporate 
governance measure and find similar results.
36
 Our findings provide an interesting 
                                                 
36
 Since 2000s, ISS calculates and reports corporate governance scores from time to time. Unfortunately, 
the scores are not time-variant and the scoring scheme has also changed each time ISS conducts a new 
survey study. We elect to use the 2013 measure to proxy for corporate governance as this is the most recent 
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contrast to recent REIT studies that find that corporate governance has little effect on 
accruals earnings management (Anglin et al. 2013) and that corporate governance is only 
weakly related to firm performance (e.g., Hartzell, Sun, and Titman 2006; Bauer, 
Eichholtz, and Kok 2010). The difference in our results could arise as the consequence of 
a different sample period as our sample covers the recent financial crisis.  
In summary, our empirical analysis on the determinants of CEO bonus shows that 
when bonus compensation is tied to a performance measure consisting of a non-GAAP 
component and a GAAP component, managers are motivated to use manipulation of the 
non-GAAP adjustments to achieve a given level of bonus compensation if managers 
choose to behave opportunistically. We further find that mandatory SEC regulations that 
apply specifically to bonus determination are more effective than general regulations 
(both voluntary and mandatory) with regard to non-GAAP reporting in constraining 
opportunistic financial reporting for bonus purposes. Lastly, corporate governance 
continues to serve as a control mechanism on managerial manipulative behavior. 
 
5.2 Additional Analysis 
The recent financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance 
when it was most needed (Kirkpatrick 2009). Since then, companies have been under 
greater scrutiny and are under enormous pressure to improve their corporate governance 
and financial reporting practices. As discussed, our sample period overlaps with the 
recent financial crisis, when REITs experienced perhaps one of the largest disasters in its 
                                                                                                                                                 
and most complete measure. Alternatively, we also adopt the 2005 Corporate Governance Quotient from 
ISS and obtain weaker but similar results with a reduced sample of 238 observations.  
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history. We therefore examine whether the crisis had an impact on CEO bonus 
compensation and FFO manipulation in the following model: 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B POST_CRISIS + β1C FFOMANI*POST_CRISIS + β2 
NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE 
+ ε   (7) 
 
Prior research (e.g., Devos, Ong, Spieler, and Tsang 2013; Devos, Spieler, and 
Tsang 2012) indicates that the REIT industry was hit hard over 2007 and 2008 before 
bouncing back in 2009. Hence, we define POSTCRISIS as a dummy variable equal to one 
(zero otherwise) for firm-year observations from 2009 onwards. Table 7 reports the 
results of regression specification (7). We find that the impact of FFO manipulation on 
CEO bonus is significantly reduced in the post-crisis period. The results imply that 
increased scrutiny on firms after the market downturn has limited the opportunity for 
managers to manipulate the performance measure and in turn to affect CEO 
compensation. We also find the coefficient of POSTCRISIS is positive and significant, 
consistent with anecdotal evidence the CEO bonus generally increases in the post-crisis 
period. 
One interesting extension of our findings is that, if the non-GAAP portion of FFO 
is being manipulated for bonus purposes, firms should be expected to make less negative 
adjustments than positive adjustments from the NAREIT-defined FFO measure to boost 
CEO bonuses. Hence, our findings that FFO manipulation is associated with CEO bonus 
should be more apparent for firms that report positive FFO deviation from NAREIT 
definition. We therefore examine the following model:   
BONUS = α + β1A NEG_FFOMANI + β1B POS_ FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 
SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε  (8) 
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Where NEG_FFOMANI (POS_FFOMANI) is FFOMANI that is smaller (greater) than 0. 
Results reported in Table 8 show that when we partition FFO manipulation into positive 
and negative amounts, positive FFO manipulations are highly associated with CEO bonus 
in both columns while negative manipulations are not related to CEO bonus. 
Thus far, our study has focused on the examination of CEO bonus as it is directly 
linked to the non-GAAP performance measure in the REIT industry. Prior studies (Isidro 
and Marques 2010; Black et al. 2011) suggest that CEO compensation is related to 
opportunistic non-GAAP reporting even when the non-GAAP measures are not used in 
compensation contracts, as managers may try to overstate the non-GAAP measures to 
affect market perceptions. If this conjecture is true, we should observe a positive 
relationship between FFO manipulation and other components of CEO compensation. 
We test this conjecture with the following model:  
CEO_COMP = α + β1 FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 
CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε (9) 
 
Where CEO_COMP represents CEO total cash compensation (excluding bonus) and 
CEO total noncash compensation reported in the Capital IQ database. Regression results 
of specification (9) are presented in Table 9. The first two columns report results using 
CEO total cash compensation (excluding bonus) as the dependent variable. We do not 
find FFOMANI to have a significant influence on other cash component of 
compensation.
37
 We also find a negative coefficient for NAREIT_FFO, possibly because 
a high fixed payment for CEO compensation may discourage CEOs to exert more effort. 
                                                 
37
 We attribute differences of results in our study and the above-mentioned pro forma studies to sample 
differences. Firms that report the pro forma measure may have used the non-GAAP measure, or some 
adjusted net income measures that are highly correlated to pro forma, in determining components of CEO 
compensation. Unfortunately, it is rather difficult for authors of these pro forma studies to identify which 
firms in their samples tie which components of CEO compensation directly to pro forma performance. In 
fact, Isidro and Marques (2010) have acknowledged this data limitation in their study.     
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Columns III and IV show FFOMANI is also not related to non-cash compensation (which 
includes mainly stock and option awards). These findings reinforce the notion that it is 
specifically the inclusion of the non-GAAP measure in bonus contract design that 
motivates opportunistic reporting of FFO in our sample firms.  
Lastly, we examine the capital market effects of FFO manipulation. We employ 
Tobin’s q, measured as the market-to-book ratio of shareholders’ equity (i.e., MTB), as a 
proxy for firms’ equity valuation. We follow the assumption that a higher Tobin’s q 
reflects higher growth expectations and/or lower discount rates (e.g., Servaes 1991; Lang 
and Stulz 1994), and that better reporting transparency could increase such growth 
expectations (Daske et al. 2008). We estimate the following model: 
Tobin’s q = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B BONUS + β1C BONUS* FFOMANI + β2 LEV + 
β3SIZE + β4 ASSETGROWTH + ε  (10) 
 
We expect that higher FFO manipulation (i.e., worse reporting transparency) is associated 
with lower values of Tobin’s q, and that the association is stronger for firms with high 
CEO bonus. We also include leverage, firm size, and asset growth as control variables in 
our estimation of model (10) (Doidge et al. 2004; Lang, Lins, and Miller 2004; Daske et 
al. 2008).
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Our results presented in Table 10 and Column I show that FFO manipulation has 
an adverse effect on equity valuation. The coefficient for FFOMANI is negative and 
marginally significant at 10%. However, in Column II, we show that the interaction of 
FFOMANI and BONUS is marginally negatively significant at 10%. The findings provide 
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 Golec (1994) shows formula REITs (i.e., REIT managers that are paid solely through advisory contracts 
and receive no direct compensation from the REIT) have larger dividend yield and smaller premium of 
market-to-book ratios. Over our sample period, formula REITs are no longer common practice in the REIT 
industry. Nonetheless, in unreported analysis we consider the possible correlations between dividend yield 
and Tobin’s q by including dividend yield as an additional control variable in (10). We find a significantly 
negative relation between the two variables as in the prior study, and our conclusions of the relationship of 
Tobin’s q and manipulation of FFO remain robust. 
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weak evidence (10% significance) that the market penalizes manipulative managerial 
actions. These actions appear to be more apparent at firms that offer high CEO bonus. 
 
5.3 Robustness Analysis
39
 
In our sensitivity analysis, we examine alternative proxies for FFOMANI and 
DACC. We measure FFOMANI as the percentage deviation from NAREIT FFO 
definition instead of on a per-share basis to alleviate the concerns of a scale effect. We 
measure DACC following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Kothari et al. (2005). Since 
some parts of FFOMANI may be recurring, we replace NAREIT_FFO with FFO in the 
previous year as control for performance. Given that NAREIT_FFO inevitably includes 
some manipulation of accruals, we “normalize” the measure by subtracting DACC from 
NAREIT_FFO. We also include other control variables such as leverage, asset growth 
and CEO age in our regressions of bonus determinants. We repeat our analysis 
controlling for outliers by eliminating bonus observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 
percentiles. Given that BONUS is a truncated variable, we replicate the analysis with the 
truncated regression model (with lower bound of zero) instead of OLS in our regression 
analysis. Our main findings continue to hold.   
An interesting issue is how various regulatory forces interact with one another to 
constrain opportunistic financial reporting for bonus purposes. To address this issue, we 
run an augmented regression model including D_NAREIT, D_RECON, D_FFOTARGET, 
and D_WFFO. We find that the effects of D_FFOTARGET and D_WFFO with 
FFOMANI remain highly significant. The findings indicate that imposing external 
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 Results in this section are not reported but are available upon request. 
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compensation regulation represents the most important safeguard in warranting the 
proper use of non-GAAP measures in bonus determination.   
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In recent years, the reporting of non-GAAP performance measures along with 
audited GAAP performance measures has slowly evolved into a norm for many firms and 
in many industries. Our study utilizes the unique setting where almost an entire industry 
has incorporated its industry-specific performance measure consisting of a GAAP 
component and a non-GAAP component in the bonus compensation contract. Even 
though FFO is commonly considered a more reliable metric compared to other non-
GAAP pro forma measures given the guidance of an industry organization (NAREIT), 
we find that REIT managers nonetheless manipulate FFO upwards in order to increase 
CEO bonus compensation. In particular, these managers manipulate the non-GAAP 
component of FFO by making ad-hoc adjustments to the NAREIT FFO definition. We 
show that mandatory SEC regulations regarding compensation disclosures are the most 
effective mechanisms in curbing the extent to which managers manipulate FFO to 
increase the CEO bonus. Moreover, good corporate governance and increased scrutiny on 
the REIT market after the financial crisis also appear to provide added safeguards to deter 
managerial manipulative actions. Finally, we find that capital market participants also 
penalize firms that manipulate FFO. In particular, firms with larger manipulation have a 
lower Tobin’s q especially when these manipulative activities are accompanied by high 
CEO bonus. 
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While non-GAAP performance measures can provide a more representative 
benchmark of firm performance and is a consideration in the design of compensation 
contract, our study highlights the concern of aggressive non-GAAP reporting when these 
measures are also used to determine CEO compensation. We show that, in this situation, 
external regulatory oversights are required to ensure fair reporting of non-GAAP 
information.   
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Total Sample 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Total Sample
Variables N Mean Median Standard Dev. Min Max
BONUS 436 442.47 25.00 907.71 0.00 7500.00
FFOMANI 436 0.43 0.14 1.53 -6.01 9.99
DACC 436 0.90 -0.51 15.51 -130.98 51.69
NAREIT_FFO 436 1.89 1.63 2.01 -7.15 10.11
SIZE 436 14.56 14.61 1.32 9.13 17.20
MTB/ Tobin's q 436 1.71 1.42 1.67 -5.01 18.45
CEO_DIR 405 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
CEO_COMP 405 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
CEO_TENURE 405 9.62 9.00 5.70 1.00 27.00
D_NAREIT 436 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
D_RECON 436 0.82 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
D_FFOTARGET 436 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
D_WFFO 436 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
CG_INDEX 426 5.46 6.00 2.78 1.00 10.00
This table reports sample statistics for 436 CEO-firm-year observations for 2006-2011. BONUS is total bonus (in 
thousands) awarded to CEO in a particular year. FFOMANI is per-share deviation of actual FFO from the NAREIT 
definition of FFO. DACC is signed discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model, scaled to per-
share basis. NAREIT_FFO is FFO, as defined according to the NAREIT definition, divided by average common 
shares outstanding. SIZE is log of beginning-of-year total assets. MTB/ Tobin’s q is market value to book value of 
shareholders’ equity. CEO_DIR is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the director of the board. 
CEO_COMP is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as a member on the compensation committee. 
CEO_TENURE is the number of years that the CEO has served the firm. D_NAREIT is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm discloses the use of the NAREIT definition of FFO in reporting its alternative performance measure, 
zero otherwise. D_RECON is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports a reconciliation schedule between net 
income and FFO, zero otherwise. D_FFOTARGET is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm discloses its target 
FFO or FFO growth for compensation purpose, zero otherwise. D_WFFO is a dummy variable equal to one the firm 
discloses the weight assigned to FFO when setting bonus, zero otherwise. CG_INDEX is defined as the corporate 
governance score reported by the ISS in 2013.  
 
TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlations 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. BONUS 1.00
2. FFOMANI 0.26 *** 1.00
3. DACC -0.10 ** 0.03 1.00
4. NAREIT_FFO 0.07 -0.47 *** 0.04 1.00
5. SIZE 0.34 *** 0.21 *** -0.05 0.22 *** 1.00
6. MTB/ Tobin's q 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.23 *** -0.10 ** 1.00
7. CEO_DIR -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
8. CEO_COMP 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 * -0.09 * 1.00
9. CEO_TENURE -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.25 *** 0.04 0.11 ** 0.47 *** -0.12 ** 1.00
10. D_NAREIT -0.11 ** 0.08 * 0.13 *** 0.08 * -0.02 0.02 0.09 * 0.13 *** 0.05 1.00
11. D_RECON -0.03 0.10 ** 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.08 * 0.10 ** 0.05 0.64 *** 1.00
12. D_FFOTARGET -0.13 *** 0.04 -0.12 *** -0.14 *** 0.10 ** -0.15 *** -0.10 ** 0.01 -0.09 * 0.14 *** 0.12 ** 1.00
13. D_WFFO -0.13 *** -0.02 -0.08 *** -0.10 ** 0.23 *** -0.16 *** -0.04 -0.18 *** -0.09 * 0.07 0.12 *** 0.50 *** 1.00
14. CG_INDEX -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.13 *** 0.04 0.19 *** 0.11 ** 0.20 *** 0.01 -0.10 ** -0.27 *** -0.24 *** 1.00
 See Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
The Impact of FFO and Accrual Manipulation on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1 FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε      (1) 
BONUS = α + β1 DACC + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε             (2) 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B DACC + β1C FFOMANI*DACC + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 
CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε             (3) 
 
Constant -1922.55
***
-1032.33
*
-2629.24
***
-2518.25
***
-1921.54
***
-1131.15
*
FFOMANI 174.90
**
179.81
**
160.83
***
162.60
***
DACC -3.82 -3.28 -0.98 -0.28
FFOMANI*DACC -2.90 -2.95
NAREIT_FFO 81.85
***
80.65
***
-2.08 -17.52 82.86
***
80.78
**
SIZE 116.16
***
127.07
***
189.59
***
210.62
***
120.67
***
132.17
***
MTB 42.25
*
84.23
**
61.77
**
121.87
***
40.27
*
81.18
*
CEO_DIR 54.68 65.79 57.45
CEO_COMP 326.78
**
279.07
*
315.86
*
CEO_TENURE -10.99 -5.19 -10.92
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R
2
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YesYesYes
0.280.270.23
405 436 405436
Yes
0.28
405
Yes
0.26
436
Yes
0.22
Yes
I II III IV VIV
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (1), (2) and (3). See Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
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TABLE 4 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation & Non-GAAP Reporting Regulation on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI*(D_NAREIT) + β1B FFOMANI*(1-D_NAREIT) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 
CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε (4.1) 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI*(D_RECON) + β1B FFOMANI*(1-D_RECON) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 
CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε (4.2) 
 
Constant -1909.06
***
-1012.25
*
-1931.88
***
-1213.96
*
FFOMANI*(D_NAREIT) 173.91
**
178.85
**
FFOMANI*(1-D_NAREIT) 190.08
**
195.70
**
FFOMANI*(D_RECON) 175.40
**
180.71
**
FFOMANI*(1-D_RECON) 166.43
*
163.47
*
NAREIT_FFO 81.83
***
80.71
***
81.80
***
80.50
**
SIZE 114.90
***
125.66
***
117.00
***
128.80
***
MTB 42.36
*
84.28
**
42.24
*
84.32
**
CEO_DIR 53.10 56.68
CEO_COMP 325.53
**
327.98
**
CEO_TENURE -11.04 -11.02
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R
2
0.26
436
Yes
0.26
Yes
Yes
436
Yes
0.28
405
Yes
0.28
405
Yes Yes Yes
I II III IV
 
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (4.1) and (4.2). See Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
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TABLE 5 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation & Compensation Disclosure Regulations on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI*(D_FFOTARGET) + β1B FFOMANI*(1-D_FFOTARGET) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 
CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε (5.1) 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI*(D_WFFO) + β1B FFOMANI*(1-D_WFFO) + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ 
β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε   (5.2) 
 
Constant -1926.63
***
-1042.18
*
-1977.03
***
-1045.16
FFOMANI*(D_FFOTARGET) 248.20 263.00
FFOMANI*(1-D_FFOTARGET) 140.75
**
142.97
**
FFOMANI*(D_WFFO) 61.42 65.09
FFOMANI*(1-D_WFFO) 198.52
**
203.04
**
NAREIT_FFO 85.00
***
84.47
***
81.68
***
80.15
***
SIZE 114.02
***
125.60
***
120.89
***
130.82
***
MTB 43.77
*
85.75
**
44.78
*
88.54
**
CEO_DIR 57.35 60.46
CEO_COMP 317.79
**
315.48
*
CEO_TENURE -10.96 -10.79
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R
2
Yes Yes Yes
I II III IV
436
Yes
0.29
405
Yes
0.28
405
0.27
436
Yes
0.27
Yes
Yes
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (5.1) and (5.2). See Table 1 for variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
 
  
 TABLE 6 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation & Corporate Governance on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B CG_INDEX + β1C FFOMANI*CG_INDEX + β2 
NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE 
+ ε   (6) 
 
Constant -1136.74
*
-1330.20
**
FFOMANI 466.94
**
471.39
**
CG_INDEX 10.49 3.64
FFOMANI*CG_INDEX -55.42
**
-55.41
**
NAREIT_FFO 81.13
***
76.21
**
SIZE 129.67
***
143.59
***
MTB 45.85
**
91.18
**
CEO_DIR 54.85
CEO_COMP 316.26
**
CEO_TENURE -9.67
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R
2
I
0.32
Yes
II
426
Yes
0.34
395
Yes Yes
 
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (6). See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
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TABLE 7 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation and Financial Crisis on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B POST_CRISIS + β1C FFOMANI*POST_CRISIS + β2 
NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE 
+ ε   (7) 
 
Constant -2056.92
***
-1218.84
*
FFOMANI 274.69
***
280.62
**
POST_CRISIS 213.63
***
236.85
***
FFOMANI*POST_CRISIS -241.88
**
-243.85
**
NAREIT_FFO 67.34
**
66.88
**
SIZE 116.46
***
127.47
***
MTB 39.17
*
72.05
*
CEO_DIR 30.99
CEO_COMP 289.82
**
CEO_TENURE -11.62
*
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R2
I II
0.31
405
Yes
0.30
436
Yes
No No
 
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (7). POST_CRISIS is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) when year is 2009 or after. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
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TABLE 8 
The Impact of Positive & Negative FFO Manipulation on CEO Bonus 
 
BONUS = α + β1A NEG_FFOMANI + β1B POS_ FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 
SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε  (8) 
 
Constant -1922.74
***
-1057.62
*
NEG_FFOMANI -81.10 -80.91
POS_FFOMANI 247.95
***
254.34
***
NAREIT_FFO 89.78
***
87.81
***
SIZE 109.51
***
121.82
***
MTB 46.72
**
90.02
**
CEO_DIR 53.97
CEO_COMP 314.88
***
CEO_TENURE -9.60
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R2
I II
0.31
405
Yes
0.29
436
Yes
Yes Yes
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (8). We partition FFOMANI into 
positive and negative amounts. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
 
 
  
TABLE 9 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation on Other Components of CEO Compensation 
 
CEO_COMP = α + β1 FFOMANI + β2 NAREIT_FFO + β3 SIZE+ β4 MTB + β5 CEO_DIR+ β6 CEO_COMP + β7 CEO_TENURE + ε
 (9) 
 
Constant -7781.47
**
-8381.96
**
-10945.45
***
-11044.87
***
FFOMANI -253.23 -254.56 21.37 19.33
NAREIT_FFO -268.17
*
-260.47
**
123.10 134.95
SIZE 614.02
**
620.32
**
745.84
***
770.25
***
MTB 71.89
*
155.44 43.68 69.42
CEO_DIR 57.82 348.10
CEO_COMP 2316.72 -239.42
CEO_TENURE -23.84
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R
2
Yes Yes Yes
I II III IV
436
Yes
0.13
405
Yes
0.28
405
0.09
436
Yes
0.29
Yes
Yes
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (9). CEO_COMP represents CEO cash compensation (excluding bonus) in columns (I) and 
(II), and CEO noncash compensation in columns (III) and (IV). See Table 1 for other variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
respectively (two-sided test). 
 
  
 
  
TABLE 10 
The Impact of FFO Manipulation on Equity Valuations 
 
Tobin’s q = α + β1A FFOMANI + β1B BONUS + β1C BONUS* FFOMANI + β2 LEV + 
β3SIZE + β4 ASSETGROWTH + ε  (10) 
 
Constant 4.83
***
5.54
***
FFOMANI -5.46
*
-4.82
BONUS 0.0003
***
BONUS*FFOMANI -0.00002
*
SIZE -0.09 -0.15
*
LEV 0.14 0.19
ASSETGROWTH -0.0006 -0.0015
Property Type Dummies
Year Dummies
N
R2
III
0.17
436
Yes
0.15
436
Yes
Yes Yes
This table reports results of OLS regression for model specification (10). See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively (two-sided test). 
